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PROHIBITING DEADBEAT DADS FROM
FATHERING MORE CHILDREN ... WHAT'S
NEXT? THE WISCONSIN SUPREME COURT'S
DECISION IN STATE V. OAKLEY
I. INTRODUCTION
Imagine a society in which courts condition individuals' rights to
parenthood on their financial status. In such a society, only those
citizens with stable incomes and the ability to provide for their present
and future children could become fathers or mothers. If only the
wealthy could become parents, perhaps the "deadbeat parents" crisis in
America would be ameliorated or would vanish altogether.' Such a
limitation might have prevented the Wisconsin Supreme Court from
ever hearing the case of State v. Oakley.
David Oakley, a thirty-four-year-old Wisconsin resident, fathered
nine children by four different women Despite the numerous support
orders entered for his children, he consistently failed to pay child
support." His employment record portrayed a man who was unable to
hold down a stable job.' Oakley's history of criminal convictions only
added to his financial and parenting troubles.' One of his four
daughters, Stephanie Oakley, wanted to change her last name.7 She has
stated of Oakley, "Ever since we were born he didn't give us no
Christmas presents, no birthday presents, no nothing .... He doesn't
deserve the [children] he has now."8
There is no doubt that David Oakley epitomizes one who has been
coined a "deadbeat dad."9 In an unprecedented decision against this
1. State v. Oakley, 629 N.W.2d 200, 203 (Wis. 2001). The majority opinion discussed the
"deadbeat parents" crisis whereby one-third of single parent households with child support
orders do not receive payment.
2. Id.
3. Vivian Berger, Bedroom Sentence, NAT'L L.J., Sept. 17,2001, at A21.
4. Oakley, 629 N.W.2d at 206.
5. Nahai Toosi & Jessica McBride, Ruling on Prolific Dad Divides His Family; Mothers,
Kids Themselves Disagree on Barring Him from Procreating, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, July
15, 2001, at 01A.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id. (quoting Stephanie Oakley in an interview) (alteration in original).
9. See generally EARL. S. JOHNSON ET AL., FATHER'S FAIR SHARE: HELPING POOR
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particular deadbeat dad, the four male justices of the Wisconsin
Supreme Court upheld the trial court's imposition of a probation
condition whereby Oakley was prohibited from fathering more children
until he demonstrated his ability to financially support them.' ° At the
risk of slipping down the proverbial slope, why not just prevent
impoverished people like Oakley from having children in the first place?
This too would serve the noble objective of reducing childhood poverty.
This Comment will argue that the Wisconsin Supreme Court should
have invoked a heightened special scrutiny test when reviewing
Oakley's probation condition. Under such a test, the condition placed
on Oakley would fail because it is overbroad, serves no rehabilitative
purpose, and other practical alternatives to achieve the same objective
without infringing upon Oakley's constitutional right to procreate are
available.
Specifically, Part II of this Comment will discuss the holding in State
v. Oakley." Part III presents a general exposition of probation
conditions and their review. Part IV discusses those probation
conditions which impinge upon fundamental rights. Part V examines
the practical ramifications and alternatives to the probation condition
set forth in Oakley.
MEN MANAGE CHILD SUPPORT AND FATHERHOOD 3-18 (1999) (coining the term
"deadbeat dad" and using throughout).
10. State v. Oakley, 629 N.W.2d 200,214 (Wis. 2001).
11. 629 N.W.2d 200 (Wis. 2001). Following the Wisconsin Supreme Court's decision,
Oakley moved for reconsideration on November 23, 2001. State v. Oakley, 635 N.W.2d 760
(Wis. 2001). In a per curiam opinion, the court denied Oakley's motion. However, the court
withdrew certain language from the original opinion in order to clarify it. The court withdrew
language that may have characterized Oakley as a child abuser. Id. (withdrawing, for
example, the words: "He has abused at least one of them."). Chief Justice Abrahamson
wrote a concurring opinion in which she concluded that "the majority has not fully stated the
facts in its opinion and in the per curiam opinion and has not considered all the facts in
applying its holding." Id. at 761. Justice Abrahamson also pointed to the record which
supported Oakley's contention that he made support payments in excess of 70%, which the
majority did not mention. Id. Finally, Justice Abrahamson concurred with the decision to
deny the motion for reconsideration because she concluded that the circuit court is the
appropriate forum for Oakley to argue compliance with his probation condition. Id.
According to Oakley's attorney, Timothy T. Kay, this denial of reconsideration opinion is
significant and will help his case when he petitions the Supreme Court of the United States.
Telephone Interview with Timothy T. Kay, Kay & Kay Law Firm (Feb. 22, 2002). Timothy
Kay filed a petition for certiorari to the United States Supreme Court in April 2002. 70
USLW 3670 (No. 01-1573).
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II. WISCONSIN PRECEDENT: STATE V. OAKLEY
A. Summary of the Facts and Lower Court Holdings
Oakley's refusal to support his children and his status as a repeat
offender precipitated the State's charge: seven counts of intentionally
refusing to pay child support as a repeat offender. 2
At the sentencing hearing in the trial court, Oakley pleaded no
contest 13 and thus "waived his right to have the State prove that he was
legally obligated to support his children and that he intentionally
refused to do so for at least 120 days."' 4 The State, after noting that
Oakley's failure to pay child support had resulted in arrearages totaling
$25,000, proposed a sentence of six years in prison. 5 Oakley, on the
other hand, asked the trial judge for the opportunity to sustain full-time
employment while supporting his children and making payments toward
his arrears.'
The trial court imposed the following sentence: three years in prison
on one of the counts, eight years (stayed) on two other counts, and a
probation period of five years to follow his incarceration. 7 Judge
Hazlewood also attached the controversial probation condition at issue:
"[W]hile on probation, Oakley cannot have any more children unless he
demonstrates that he had the ability to support them and that he is
supporting the children he already had." 8
The appellate court affirmed the trial court's holding, finding that
the probation condition "was not overly broad and that it was
12. Oakley's repeat offender status stemmed from "intimidating two witnesses in a child
abuse case-where one of the victims was his own child." Oakley, 629 N.W.2d at 206. Oakley
subsequently entered into a plea agreement from which the State withdrew upon learning
that his probation in Sheboygan was being revoked. Id. at 202.
13. Following the dissolution of the first plea agreement, Oakley entered another with
the State "in which he agreed to enter a no contest plea to three counts of intentionally
refusing to support his children and have the other four counts read-in for sentencing." Id.
He also agreed that on appeal, he would not complain of the State's withdrawal of the initial
plea agreement. Id. In exchange, the State agreed to cap its sentencing recommendation to




17. In deriving this sentence, "Judge Hazlewood observed that 'if Mr. Oakley had paid
something, had made an earnest effort to pay anything within his remote ability to pay, we
wouldn't be sitting here."' Id. at 202-03. However, he also acknowledged that "'if Mr.
Oakley goes to prison, he's not going to be in a position to pay any meaningful support for




reasonable." 9 Subsequently, Oakley petitioned the Wisconsin Supreme
Court for review, which the court granted.'
B. The Issue Defined
On appeal, the Wisconsin Supreme Court considered both Oakley's
constitutional challenge to the probation condition and his contention
that the "State was impermissibly allowed to withdraw from an earlier
plea agreement .... ,2, The discussion in this Comment is tailored to
focus entirely on the constitutional issue, to which the better part of the
majority opinion was devoted.22
Oakley condemned the probation condition as an unconstitutional
infringement on his right to procreate. 23 Further, he claimed that the
infringement did not satisfy the "strict scrutiny" test because the
probation condition was not narrowly tailored to serve the State's
concededly compelling interest in requiring parents to support their
children.24
C. The Majority's Analysis and Holding
The majority2' began its review with an examination of the
"deadbeat parent" crisis and the implications this crisis has for both
children and single parents.2' The court determined that "[t]he effects of
the nonpayment of child support on our children are particularly
troubling. In addition to engendering long-term consequences such as
19. "After sentencing, Oakley filed for post-conviction relief," challenging both the
probation condition and the State's withdrawal from the initial plea agreement. Id.
Concerning the latter challenge (not the focal issue of this Comment), the court of appeals
found that Oakley's agreement to enter the second plea agreement resulted in a waiver to
challenge "matters relating to the first plea agreement." Id. at 203 (citations omitted).
20. Id.
21. Id. at 213. With regard to the issue of improper withdrawal from the first plea
agreement, the court, agreeing with the court of appeals, held that Oakley waived any claim
of error for the State's withdrawal from the initial plea agreement when he entered the
subsequent plea agreement and pleaded no contest. Id.
22. Id. at 203-13.
23. Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner's Brief in the Wisconsin Supreme Court at 5, State
v. Oakley, 629 N.W.2d 200 (Wis. 2001) (No. 99-3328-CR).
24. Oakley, 629 N.W.2d at 208.
25. Justice Jon P. Wilcox wrote the majority opinion. Concurring opinions by Justices
William A. Bablitch, N. Patrick Crooks, and David Prosser, Jr. were also filed, but they are
not subject to an in-depth analysis by this Comment.
26. See Oakley, 629 N.W.2d at 203. The majority considers a vast number of statistics
regarding the number of single parents that actually receive child support payments, the
percentage of single moms below the poverty line, etc. Id.
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poor health, behavioral problems, delinquency and low educational
attainment, inadequate child support is a direct contributor to childhood
poverty.'27 In light of these determinations, the court then noted that
the Wisconsin Legislature attached "severe sanctions" to the crime of
intentionally refusing to pay child support.28
Next, the majority contemplated the broad discretion given to trial
judges in addressing a violation of child support requirements.29 In fact,
a judge may choose a probation sentence instead of a more harsh
sanction of incarceration." The probation sentence may be coupled
with particular "conditions which appear to be reasonable and
appropriate."3 In exercising discretion, the judge may devise conditions
of probation aimed to "meet the rehabilitative needs of the
defendant. ,3 2 At the same time, the judge must take steps to ensure the
27. Id. at 204 (citing Martha Garrison, The Goals and Limits of Child Support Policy 16
in CHILD SUPPORT: THE NExT FRONTIER (J. Thomas Oldham & Marygold S. Melli eds.,
2000)).
28. Oakley, 629 N.W.2d at 205. The Wisconsin Legislature has made it a Class E felony
to violate WIS. STAT. § 948.22(2) (1999-2000), punishing "[a]ny person who intentionally fails
for 120 or more consecutive days to provide spousal, grandchild or child support which the
person knows or reasonably should know the person is legally obligated to provide." WIS.
STAT. § 948.22(2) .(1999-2000).
29. A Wisconsin judge can consider a number of factors when awarding a sentence,
including the following:
IT]he past record of criminal offenses; any history of undesirable behavior patterns;
the defendant's personality, character and social traits; the results of a presentence
investigation; the vicious or aggravated nature of the crime; the degree of the
defendant's culpability; the defendant's demeanor at trial; the defendant's age,
educational background and employment record; the defendant's remorse,
repentance and cooperativeness; the defendant's need for close rehabilitative
control; the rights of public; and the length of pretrial detention.
Oakley, 629 N.W.2d at 205 (quoting State v. Guzman, 480 N.W.2d 446 (Wis. 1992)).
30. Id. (citing WIS. STAT. § 973.09(1)(a) (1999-2000)). This section reads:
Except as provided in par. (c) or if probation is prohibited for a particular offense by
statute, if a person is convicted of a crime, the court, by order, may withhold
sentence or impose sentence under s. 973.15 and stay its execution, and in either case
place the person on probation to the department for a stated period, stating in the
order the reasons therefor. The court may impose any conditions which appear to
be reasonable and appropriate. The period of probation may be made consecutive
to a sentence on a different charge, whether imposed at the same time or previously.
If the court imposes an increased term of probation, as authorized under sub. (2) (a)
2. or (b) 2., it shall place its reasons for doing so on the record.
WIS. STAT. § 973.09(1)(a) (1999-2000).
31. WIS. STAT. § 973.09(1)(a).
32. Oakley, 629 N.W.2d at 205 (quoting State v. Gray, 590 N.W.2d 918 (Wis. 1999)).
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protection of "society and potential victims from future wrongdoing" by
the defendant.33
The majority acknowledged that such broad discretion on the part of
trial judges has been criticized in the past where judges have imposed
probation conditions reflective of their own values instead of values
tailored to a rehabilitative purpose.34 Here, however, the court felt the
trial judge had fashioned "a sentence that would address Oakley's
ongoing refusal to face his obligations to his nine children as required by
law" while protecting society and potential victims. 35
On the other hand, Oakley argued that the probation condition
represented a violation of his constitutional right to procreate. He
argued that the probation condition should be tested under strict
scrutiny; whereby, it must be "narrowly tailored to serve a compelling
state interest."37 Oakley did not deny that the State's interest in
mandating parents to financially support their children was a compelling
interest, but he argued that the probation condition was not narrowly
tailored to meet that interest because his "right to procreate is not
restricted but in fact eliminated."3" Oakley maintained that his right to
procreate was eliminated because he would never be able to support his
children, and if he did exercise his fundamental right on probation, he
would face the eight-year stayed prison term.39
The majority was not persuaded by Oakley's analysis.' In rejecting
the strict scrutiny test, the court instead adopted a reasonability
standard to assess a probation condition that may infringe upon a
fundamental right.41 This standard is characterized as permitting
33. Id. at 206.
34. See id.
35. Id. at 207.
36. Id. In accordance with the United States Supreme Court, the Wisconsin Supreme
Court has recognized the liberty interest of a citizen in deciding whether or not to procreate.
Id. (citing Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942); Eberhardy v.
Circuit Court for Wood County, 307 N.W.2d 881 (Wis. 1981)).
37. Oakley, 629 N.W.2d at 207-08 (citing Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 388 (1978)).
38. Id. at 208.
39. Id.
40. See id. at 208-09.
41. See id. at 210 n.27. The court indicated a number of cases in which a reasonableness
standard was invoked to evaluate probation conditions that infringe upon convicted
individual's fundamental rights. Id. Such rights include: First Amendment-Freedom of
Speech, First Amendment-Freedom of Association, First Amendment-Freedom of Religion,
Second Amendment-Right to Bear Arms, Fourth Amendment-Right to be Free from
Unreasonable Searches and Seizures, Right to Engage in Political Activity or Run for
Political Office, Freedom of Movement, and Right to Procreate. Id.
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conditions of probation to "impinge upon constitutional rights as long as
they are not overly broad and are reasonably related to the person's
rehabilitation. "42
In applying this standard to the probation condition at hand, the
court found the condition was not overly broad because it did not
prevent Oakley from exercising his right to procreate, as long as he met
the condition by making an effort to pay child support.4'3 The majority
also highlighted the fact that when the term of probation expired, the
condition would also expire, and Oakley would be free to exercise his
right to procreate."
Finally, the majority found that the condition was "reasonably
related to the goal of rehabilitation. "4  According to the court, the
rehabilitative goal in this case was to prevent Oakley from creating
more victims should he persist in his failure to pay child support.4 The
court reasoned that the probation condition essentially banned Oakley
from future violations of the law.47 In short, the probation condition
satisfied the reasonability standard because it was not overly broad, and
it was reasonably related to Oakley's rehabilitation. Thus, an
infringement of constitutional rights was justified.48
D. The Dissent's Analysis
Justice Ann Walsh Bradley, Chief Justice Shirley Abrahamson, and
Justice Diane Sykes dissented in this case.49 Justice Bradley began her
analysis by accentuating the significance of the right to procreate. 0 She
maintained that "[t]he right to have children is a basic human right and
an aspect of the fundamental liberty which the Constitution jealously
guards for all Americans."'" Justice Bradley argued that while the
majority acknowledged the right to procreate, they did not contemplate
42. Id. at 210 (quoting Edwards v. State, 246 N.W.2d 109 (Wis. 1976)).
43. Id. at 212.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 213.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. See id. at 210 (citing Edwards v. State, 246 N.W.2d 109 (Wis. 1976)).
49. The three dissenting opinions are set forth by the three female justices on the
Wisconsin Supreme Court. Justice Bradley and Justice Sykes filed separate opinions, but all
three justices joined in each dissenting opinion filed. Oakley, 629 N.W.2d at 216-23.
50. Id. at 216 (Bradley, J., dissenting).
51. Id. (Bradley, J., dissenting) (relying on Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316
U.S. 535, 536 (1942)).
2002]
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
its "preeminence."52 In addition to the constitutional implications, thedissent also examined the "collateral consequences" and "practical
problems" with the majority's holding. 3
This preeminence of the right to procreate was established in the
United States Supreme Court case of Skinner v. Oklahoma, according to
the dissent. 4 In Skinner, the Court described the right to bear children
as a "'basic liberty' ... 'fundamental to the very existence and survival
of the [human] race.'"" Further, the right to bear children has been
construed as residing "in the sphere of personal privacy protected from
unjustified governmental intrusion by the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment." 6
The dissent argued that because the right to procreate is a
fundamental right, the probation condition in this case should be
subjected to heightened scrutiny.' While the dissent conceded that
probationary conditions may encroach upon constitutional rights, the
conditions must be "reasonably related to the probationer's
rehabilitation," while not being "'overly broad.' "" In short, this part of
the dissent argued that the State may justify such a probation condition
only if it is "narrowly drawn" to serve the State's interest."
Next, Justice Bradley argued that the majority and concurring
opinions erroneously construed the probation condition to require
intent (intentionally failing to pay child support payments), where the
condition itself simply prohibited Oakley from fathering more children
until he could prove his financial capability to support his existing
childrenw Therefore, the majority's interpretation would permit Oakley
to satisfy his probation condition by simply trying to meet the condition.
The dissent focused on the actual language that prohibited Oakley from
fathering more children unless he could show to the Court his ability to
52. Id. at 216 (Bradley, J., dissenting).
53. Id. at 219-20 (Bradley, J., dissenting).
54. Id. at 216 (Bradley, J., dissenting).
55. Id. (Bradley, J., dissenting) (alteration in original) (quoting Skinner, 316 U.S. at
541).
56. Id. (Bradley, J., dissenting) (quoting Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972)).
57. Id. at 217 (Bradley, J., dissenting) (citing Edwards v. State, 246 N.W.2d 109 (Wis.
1976)).
58. Id. (Bradley, J., dissenting) (quoting in part, Edwards, 246 N.W.2d 109 (Wis. 1976)).
59. See id. at 217 (Bradley, J., dissenting) (quoting Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431U.S. 678, 688-89 (1977)). "IT]he probation condition cannot be considered a narrowly drawn
means of advancing the [Sitate's interest in ensuring support for Oakley's children." Id. at
218 (Bradley, J., dissenting).
60. Id. at 217 (Bradley, J., dissenting).
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pay child support, or "that he is meeting the needs of his other
children ... ,,61
According to the dissent, the condition was not narrowly drawn to
further the State's interest, because it effectively eliminates Oakley's
right to bear children and because the trial court recognized Oakley's
inability to meet the probation condition.62  In support of this
contention, Justice Bradley relied on the United States Supreme Court's
holding in Zablocki v. Redhail where a "statutory prohibition on the
right to marry... was not a justifiable means of advancing the state's
[sic] interest in providing support for children."63 In Zablocki, the Court
found that there were alternative means of advancing the State's interest
that did not impinge on the fundamental right to marry.' Likewise, the
dissent argued that there were alternative approaches to advance the
State's interest in providing for Oakley's children other than the
unconstitutional probation condition.65
In addition to the constitutional implications of the majority's
holding, the dissent also highlighted the "collateral consequences and
practical problems" inherent in the court's decision.66 First, the dissent
contemplated the risks of "coercive [] abortion" if Oakley impregnates a
woman.67  Justice Bradley suggested that because of the probation
condition, Oakley has a strong incentive to demand a woman (pregnant
with his child) to undergo an abortion-thus preventing his
incarceration for a term of eight years. Second, Justice Bradley
accused the majority of attaching "a sliding scale of wealth" to the right
61. Id. (Bradley, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
62. Id. at 217-18 (Bradley, J., dissenting).
63. Id. at 218 (Bradley, J., dissenting) (citing Zablocki, 434 U.S. 374 (1978)).
64. Id. (Bradley, J., dissenting) (relying on Zablocki, 434 U.S. 374, 388-90).
65. Id. at 218 n.3. Justice Bradley listed a few alternative approaches that could be used
to advance the State's interest:
[Slentence Oakley to eight years in prison; stay the sentence and place him on
probation; a condition of probation is that he serve a substantial amount of time in
jail with work release privileges; after getting'work release hours extended, another
condition of probation is that he maintain two full-time jobs, working a minimum of
70 hours per week; conditions of probation also include parenting classes and
alcohol and drug assessment/counseling if deemed appropriate.
Id. at 219 n.3 (Bradley, J., dissenting).
66. Id. at 219 (Bradley, J., dissenting).
67. See id. at 219 (Bradley, J., dissenting) (relying on People v. Pointer, 199 Cal. Rptr.
357 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984)).
68. Id. (Bradley, J., dissenting).
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to have children.69 She argued that men and women alike are allowed tohave as many children as they wish, and if they cannot ultimately
provide the necessary support, then they must face the legal
consequences."0
Finally, the dissent pointed out the impracticality of the probation
condition."1 Because the condition did not prevent Oakley from havingintercourse, and because there is no realistic way to monitor his sexual
activity, there would be no effective way to prevent him from fathering
more children.72 Further, if Oakley were to father another child, he
would be forced to return to prison while leaving behind his dependent
children.73
Justice Bradley concluded her dissent by reiterating her disapproval
of Oakley's conduct." However, she underscored the fundamental
nature of the right to procreate, and the need to protect that right.
Ultimately, she drew attention to the fact that the Wisconsin Supreme
Court was the only court in the country to deem this condition
constitutional.76
Justice Bradley's dissenting opinion was followed by Justice Sykes's
brief dissent. In short, Justice Sykes argued that while Oakley, a
convicted felon, may endure "limitations on the fundamental humanliberties the rest of us freely enjoy, he cannot constitutionally be banned
from having further children without court permission. '78 She
maintained that because there are reasonable alternatives to theprobationary condition at issue, the State had gone too far by infringing
upon the fundamental right to procreate. 9
The dissent also took issue with the majority's comparison ofOakley's loss of reproductive freedom on probation with the loss he
would have experienced had he been incarcerated. Justice Bradley
wrote, "[T]he fact of the matter is that Oakley had not been imprisoned.
He is a probationer and has retained a degree of his liberty, including 'a
69. Id. (Bradley, J., dissenting).
70. Id. (Bradley, J., dissenting).
71. See id. at 220 (Bradley, J., dissenting).
72. Id. (Bradley, J., dissenting).
73. Id. (Bradley, J., dissenting).
74. Id. at 221 (Bradley, J., dissenting).
75. Id. at 220 (Bradley, J., dissenting).
76. Id. (Bradley, J., dissenting).
77. Id. at 221-23 (Sykes, J., dissenting).
78. Id. at 222 (Sykes, J., dissenting).
79. See id. at 222 (Sykes, J., dissenting).
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significant degree of privacy under the Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth
Amendments.' 8°  This quote underscores the divergence between
incarceration and probation, two entirely different sentences.
III. PROBATION
A. Generally
Probation is a "court-imposed criminal sentence that, subject to
stated conditions, releases a convicted person into the community
instead of sending the criminal to prison."'" This concept grew out of
the recognition that harsh prison sentences do not necessarily
rehabilitate criminals to the extent that future crime is thwarted. 2
Instead, probation permits the wrongdoer "to reform without the stigma
or the corruptive influences of prison."83 Finally, the overcrowding of
prisons and the associated economic repercussions lend Support to the
probationary system."
If a sentencing court decides to grant probation, then general
conditions are usually attached, such as a requirement to maintain
lawful conduct and steady employment.85 In addition, the trial judge
may devise individualized conditions aimed at the rehabilitation of the
particular defendant, such as participating in a family counseling or a
drug rehabilitation program.86 In effect, both federal and state judges
have wide latitude in fashioning probationary conditions. The
following sections, with emphasis on Wisconsin's approach, will
80. Id. at 218 (Sykes, J., dissenting) (quoting People v. Pointer, 199 Cal. Rptr. 357, 368
(Cal. Ct. App. 1984)).
81. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 503 (Pocket ed. 1996).
82. John Augustus, often regarded as the -"Father of Probation," frequently stated,
"[T]he object of the law is to reform criminals and to prevent crime, and not to punish
maliciously or from a spirit of revenge." PAUL F. CROMWELL & GEORGE G. KILLINGER,
COMMUNITY-BASED CORRECTIONS: PROBATION, PAROLE, AND INTERMEDIATE
SANCTIONS 11 (3d ed. 1994). Augustus' efforts resulted in the passage of the first probation
law in the United States, which was enacted in 1878. Id.
83. Jaimy M. Levine, Comment, "Join the Sierra Club!": Imposition of Ideology as a
Condition of Probation, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 1841,1851 (1994).
84. Id. at 1852. "'[P]robation costs about one-fourteenth as much as imprisonment." Id.
at 1852 n.52. (quoting ABA SENTENCING STANDARDS, Std. 18-2.3 cmt., at 77).
85. CLAIR A. CRIPE, LEGAL ASPECTS OF CORRECTIONS MANAGEMENT 25 (Michael
G. Pearlman ed. 1997).
86. Id. at 25.
87. Scott J. Jebson, Conditioning a Woman's Probation on Her Using Norplant: New
Weapon Against Child Abuse Backfires, 17 CAMPBELL L. REV. 301, 304 (1995).
20021
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expound upon judges' authority and motivations to impose a probation
sentence.
B. The Statutory Authority and Objectives of Probation
A state or federal judge's power to impose probation is derived from
statute." The statutory authority for federal courts was guided by the
Federal Probation Act, 9 which is in effect for crimes committed before
November 1, 1987." Under this Act, the court is empowered to
condition probation "upon such terms and conditions as the court deems
best."'" While this statutory language gives a federal judge broad
discretion in fashioning the probation sentence, as least one district
court has required that the "terms ... be reasonably related to the
purposes of the Act. In determining whether a reasonable relationship
exists ... it [is] necessary to give consideration to the purposes sought to
be served by probation."92
Just as the Federal Probation Act contains liberal language, in
general, so do the state probationary statutes. Although the
probationary statutes vary from state-to-state, a common thread among
them is the discretion accorded to the trial judges in fashioning the
probation terms and attaching conditions.93 For example, Wisconsin's
probation statute allows the court to "impose any conditions which
appear to be reasonable and appropriate."94
The Wisconsin courts have broadly construed this statutory
authority.95 The Wisconsin Supreme Court has adopted standard 3.2 of
the American Bar Association Standards Relating to Probation
88. See id.; see also Levine, supra note 83, at 1849; Elinor F. Parker, Comment, BirthControl as a Probation Condition for Child Abusers-Creative Alternative or Unconstitutional
Condition?, 19 W. ST. U. L. REV. 289,291.
89. Act of Mar. 4,1925, ch. 521,43 Stat. 1259, 1259-61 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.§§ 3651-3656 (1988) (repealed or renumbered by Pub. L. 98-473, Title II, § 212(a)(1), (2),
Oct. 12, 1984, 98 Stat. 1987)). Congress passed the Federal Probation Act in 1925,
empowering federal judges to impose probation conditions. ARTHUR W. CAMPBELL, LAW
OF SENTENCING 101-02 (2d ed. 1991). In 1987, the federal system's perception of probation
evolved into one that viewed probation as a sentence like any other sentence, as opposed to a
mere suspension of a sentence. Id. This view is now codified in 18 U.S.C. § 3551. Id.
90. See 18 U.S.C. § 3651.
91. Levine, supra note 83, at 1849 (quoting Federal Probation Act § 3651).
92. United States v. Virginia Consuelo-Gonzalez, 521 F.2d 259, 262 (9th Cir. 1975).
93. See Jebson, supra note 87, at 304.
94. WIs. STAT. § 973.09(1)(a) (1999-2000).
95. E.g., State v. Nienhardt, 537 N.W.2d 123, 125-26 (Wis. Ct. App. 1995).
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(Approved Draft, 1970).96 This standard concerns the "nature and
determination of [probationary] conditions," and reads in part:
"It should be a condition to every sentence of probation that the
probationer lead a law-abiding life during the period of his
probation. No other conditions should be required by statute;
but the sentencing court should be authorized to prescribe
additional conditions to fit the circumstances of each case."97
While such language permits the judge to fashion a probation
sentence that accords with the Wisconsin statute and the ABA
probation standard, the courts have stated that "[p]robation is not a
matter of right, rather it is a privilege. ' In deciding whether to place
the convicted individual on probation instead of in prison, the courts
-must contemplate whether the individual will be rehabilitated via
supervision, and yet not pose a danger to society.99
C. Appellate Review of Probation Conditions
Probation conditions fashioned by the lower courts are not left
unchecked; appellate courts review the conditions to determine
reasonableness."°° This review is essential because "unreviewed exercise
of discretion could result in the imposition of restraints which bear no
reasonable relation to the purposes of probation."' ' Accordingly, the
Wisconsin appellate courts determine the reasonableness of a probation
condition by assessing how well it effectuates the "dual goals" of
probation: the rehabilitation of the convicted individual and the
safeguarding of the societal interest.'02
96. See Edwards v. State, 246 N.W.2d 109, 110 (Wis. 1976) (citing State v. Garner, 194
N.W.2d 649 (Wis. 1972)).
97. Id. (quoting Section 3.2(a) of American Bar Association Standards Relating to
Probation (Approved Draft, 1970)).
98. Id. at 111.
99. See State v. Evans, 252 N.W.2d 664, 666 (Wis. 1977).
100. See People v. Dominguez, 64 Cal. Rptr. 290, 293 (Cal. Ct. App. 1967). "The trial
court has very wide discretion in setting the conditions of probation, but its discretion is not
boundless." Id.
101. Huggett v. State, 266 N.W.2d 403,406 n.5 (Wis. 1978).
102. Id. at 407; see also State v. Lo, 599 N.W.2d 659, 661 (Wis. Ct. App. 1999); State v.
Simonetto, 606 N.W.2d 275, 277 (Wis. Ct. App. 1999); State v. Miller, 499 N.W.2d 215, 216
(Wis. Ct. App. 1993). Federal courts also review conditions with probationary goals in mind.
E.g., United States v. Virginia Consuelo-Gonzalez, 521 F.2d 259, 262 (9th Cir. 1975). The
Consuelo-Gonzalez court stated, "In determining whether a reasonable relationship exists,
we have found it necessary to give consideration to the purposes sought to be served by
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A similar approach to assessing reasonableness is set forth in the
widely adopted three-part test developed by a California appellate court
in People v. Dominguez. 3 The Dominguez test stipulates the following:
A condition of probation which (1) has no relationship to the
crime of which the offender was convicted, (2) relates to the
conduct which is not in itself criminal, and (3) requires or forbids
conduct which is not reasonably related to future criminality
does not serve the statutory ends of probation and is invalid. ' ,
If the probation condition meets each of the three Dominguez test
criteria, then the condition is held to be unreasonable. The Dominguez
test is a variation of the "reasonable relationship" test spelled out by the
Ninth Circuit in Higdon v. United States.0 5
The Higdon court set forth a two-prong inquiry where the reviewing
court must first conclude that the lower court imposed the conditions for
permissible purposes, and secondly, the conditions must be reasonably
related to those purposes." The court construed permissible purposes
of probation to be only those that are imposed to facilitate defendant
rehabilitation and public protection.'7
While a sentencing judge has broad discretion, he or she is limited
not only by the reasonableness requirements above, but also by basic
standards of criminal law."°8 Generally, courts cannot impose probation
conditions that would also constitute improper penal or parole
conditions."° For instance, the Ninth Circuit struck down a probation
probation, the extent to which the full constitutional guarantees available to those not under
probation should be accorded probationers, and the legitimate needs of law enforcement." Id.
at 262.
103. 64 Cal. Rptr. at 293. Besides California, many other states have adopted the
Dominguez test; including Wisconsin in State v. Garner, 194 N.W.2d 649, 652 n.5 (Wis. 1972)(although the Dominguez test was not expressly adopted, the court relied upon the same
three criteria in determining the reasonableness of the probation condition). See Garner, 194
N.W.2d at 652 n.5; see also Jebson, supra note 88, at 304 n.15.
104. Dominguez, 64 Cal. Rptr. at 293.
105. 627 F.2d 893, 897 (9th Cir. 1980); see Levine, supra note 83, at 1855-56.
106. Higdon, 627 F.2d at 897.
107. Id. at 897-98. In Higdon, the defendant was convicted of defrauding the
government. Id. at 896. As a condition of probation, the lower court required the defendant
to forfeit all of his assets and work for charity for three years without pay. Id. The Ninth
Circuit reviewed these conditions of probation and held that the conditions were
impermissible "because they were not reasonably related to rehabilitation of the offender or
protection of the public." Id. at 898.
108. See United States v. Tonry, 605 F.2d 144, 148 (5th Cir. 1979).
109. See Levine, supra note 83, at 1857 (citing United States v. Virginia Consuelo-
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condition requiring a probationer to donate a pint of blood."0 Likewise,
a court cannot fashion conditions which are "impossible or extremely
difficult to satisfy.""'
Like many of the aforementioned courts, the Wisconsin Supreme
Court in Oakley determined that the probation condition prohibiting
Oakley from fathering more children was reasonable because it was
both rehabilitative and did not pose a threat to society."' However,
Oakley argued that the probation condition implicated his constitutional
right to procreate and therefore, warranted strict scrutiny."3
IV. PROBATION CONDITIONS THAT IMPINGE CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHTS
A. Probationers' Constitutional Rights
The United States Supreme Court in Griffin v. Wisconsin1
4
concluded that a probationer does not behold the "absolute liberty" to
which other citizens are entitled."5  Instead, the Court found that
probationers were entitled only to "conditional liberty" dependent upon
the restrictions in their probation conditions." Although a
probationer's liberty interest is diminished, courts have acknowledged
that probationers still have "the right to enjoy a significant degree of
privacy, or liberty, under the Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth
Amendments to the Federal Constitution. ""'7
Still, a probation condition that impinges upon a probationer's
Gonzalez, 521 F.2d 259,265 (9th Cir. 1975)).
110. Consuelo-Gonzalez, 521 F.2d at 264 (citing Springer v. United States, 148 F.2d 411,
416 (9th Cir. 1945)).
111. Shana Weiss, Note, A Penny for Your Thoughts: Revisiting Commonwealth v.
Power, 17 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 201, 211 (1996) (citation omitted). For instance, it would
be very difficult for a probationer to meet a condition by abstaining from discussing his
opinions of the probationary system. Conseulo-Gonzalez, 521 F.2d at 264 (citing Morrissey v.
Brewer, 408 U.S. 471,480 (1972)).
112. State v. Oakley, 629 N.W.2d 200,201-02 (Wis. 2001).
113. Id. at 207.
114. 483 U.S. 868 (1987).
115. Id. at 874 ("To a greater or lesser degree, it is always true of probationers... that
they do not enjoy 'the absolute liberty to which every citizen is entitled, but only...
conditional liberty properly dependent on observance of special [probation] restrictions.'")
(quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471,480 (1972)).
116. Id. at 874.
117. Parker, supra note 88, at 295-96 (quoting language from People v. Keller, 76 Cal.
App. 3d 827, 832 (1978)).
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fundamental rights is not per se impermissible."' Instead, courts apply
"special scrutiny" to such conditions to determine if the limitation
advances the dual goals of probation-rehabilitation and public safety."9
Thus, in a constitutional challenge to a probation condition, the question
becomes one of whether the judge crossed the fine line between a
permissible and impermissible impingement on a probationer's rights.
The logical question remains: where do we draw that line? 2'
B. Conditions Impinging Fundamental Rights,. Generally
Countless federal and state courts alike, including Wisconsin, have
held that probation conditions may impinge on a probationer's
constitutional rights as long as they are reasonably related to the
defendant's rehabilitation.' However, when a probation condition does
impinge upon a fundamental right, such as the right to procreate, the
courts usually subject the condition to special scrutiny.' The court in
United States v. Virginia Consuelo-Gonzalez set forth the special
scrutiny test for probation conditions that impinge upon fundamental
rights." Consuelo-Gonzalez, the defendant, was convicted for
possession of heroin with the intent to distribute. 4 As a condition ofher probation, the defendant was required to "'submit to search of her
person or property at any time when requested by a law-enforcement
officer.' "'5 On appeal, Consuelo-Gonzalez argued that the trial court
erroneously failed to suppress evidence obtained from a search of her
home. 26 Defendant argued that the probation condition authorizing
118. See United States v. Virginia Consuelo-Gonzalez, 521 F.2d 259, 265 n.14 (9th Cir.
1975).
119. Id. at 265.
120. See, e.g., Parker, supra note 88, at 296.
121. See, e.g., United States v. Tonry, 605 F.2d 144, 150 (5th Cir. 1979) ("[Pjrobation
condition is not necessarily invalid simply because it affects a probationer's ability to exercise
constitutionally protected rights."); Consuelo-Gonzalez, 521 F.2d at 265 n.14 ("Merelybecause a convicted individual's fundamental rights are involved should not make a probation
condition which limits those rights automatically suspect."); Smith v. State, 727 N.E.2d 763,767 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000) ("[T]he condition may impinge upon the probationer's exercise of an
otherwise constitutionally protected right."); Edwards v. State, 246 N.W.2d 109, 111 (Wis.1976) ("[C]onditions of probation may impinge upon constitutional rights as long as they are
not overly broad and are reasonably related to the person's rehabilitation.").
122. See Consuelo-Gonzalez, 521 F.2d at 265 ("Conditions that unquestionably restrict
otherwise inviolable constitutional rights may properly be subject to special scrutiny .....
123. Id. at 265.
124. Id. at 261.




such warrantless searches was improper because it did not "meet the
Fourth Amendment's standard of reasonableness."'
27
Judge Sneed, writing for the Ninth Circuit, enhanced the level of
scrutiny for probation conditions implicating constitutional rights to that
of special scrutiny;128 thereby requiring more than a mere reasonable
relationship between the condition and the purposes of probation.1
9
The court held that the appropriate test of a probation condition's
constitutionality was not whether the fundamental rights limited by the
condition would be afforded "preference" under the usual constitutional
analysis, but whether the "limitations [on the fundamental rights] are
primarily designed to affect the rehabilitation of the probationer or
insure the protection of the public."'3° In applying the test, the court
looked at the following factors: the scope of constitutional guarantees to
which a probationer (as opposed to non-probationer) is entitled, 3' the
relationship between the condition and the rehabilitative purposes of
the Federal Probation Act, and the justifiable needs of law enforcement
in protecting the community.32
In applying this special scrutiny analysis to Consuelo-Gonzalez's
probation condition authorizing warrantless searches, the Ninth Circuit
held it to be an impermissible condition 33 because it permitted "searches
which could not possibly serve the ends of probation."'34
C. Conditions Impinging the Fundamental Right to Procreate
Although the Consuelo-Gonzalez holding does not directly extend
to state cases concerning probation conditions that impinge
constitutional rights,"' the special scrutiny analysis has been applied by
127. Id.
128. Id. at 265.
129. See, e.g., Higdon v. United States, 627 F.2d 893, 898(9th Cir. 1980) (setting forth the
"reasonable relationship" test for probation conditions).
130. Consuelo-Gonzalez, 521 F.2d. at 265 n.14.
131. Id. at 264-65.
132. Id. at 266-67 (Choy, J., concurring). For a similar analysis, see Trammell v. State of
Indiana, 751 N.E.2d 283, 288 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001). When a defendant claims a probation
condition impinges a constitutional right, the Trammell court balances the following factors:
"(1) [T]he purpose sought to be served by probation; (2) the extent to which constitutional
rights enjoyed by law abiding citizens should be afforded to probationers; and (3) the
legitimate needs of law enforcement." Id.
133. Consuelo-Gonzalez, 521 F.2d at 267.
134. Id. at 265.
135. See id. at 266 ("[W]e express no opinion here regarding the extent to which the
states constitutionally may impose conditions more intrusive on the probationer's privacy
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some courts in testing probation conditions that implicate fundamental
rights-including the right to procreate.36
While the United States Constitution does not explicitly mention the
right to procreate, the Supreme Court has recognized the right to bear
children as being fundamental, inherent in the right to privacy.'37
"Privacy" is not privacy in the general sense, but rather in the
constitutional sense, referring to "the right of individuals to make
certain personal choices in the realm of sexual relationships, familial
relationships, and child-bearing. A term such as... 'self-determination'
would more aptly denote this right. ", 31
In Griswold v. Connecticut,'39 the Supreme Court struck down a
statutory provision prohibiting married persons from using
contraceptives. "' The Court deemed the statute unconstitutional
because it intruded upon the most intimate details of a marital
relationship, such as the decision of whether to procreate. 4' Griswold
was a groundbreaking decision because it recognized a fundamental
constitutional right to privacy within the "penumbra" of the Bill of
Rights.4'
The holding of Griswold was carried one step further in Eisenstadt v.
Baird.'3  There, the Court held that a ban on the distribution of
than those we here have indicated are proper under the Federal Probation Act.").
136. See, e.g., People v. Zaring, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d 263,268 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992); People v.
Pointer, 199 Cal. Rptr. 357, 364-65 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984); State v. Miller, 499 N.W.2d 215, 217
(Wis. Ct. App. 1993).
137. See generally Nadine Strossen, The Right To Be Let Alone: Constitutional Privacy
in Griswold, Roe, and Bowers, in BENCHMARKS: GREAT CONSTITUTIONAL
CONTROVERSIES IN THE SUPREME COURT 87-116 (Terry Eastland, ed. 1995) (comparing the
three major cases that shaped the doctrine of "constitutional privacy" under the Fourteenth
Amendment: Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973);
and Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986)). The first major case to recognize the
constitutional right to privacy was Griswold. In that case, the Supreme Court struck down a
Connecticut law which prohibited the use of contraceptives-even by married couples.
Griswold, 381 U.S. at 486. The Court concluded that the privacy right fell within the "zone of
privacy created by several fundamental constitutional guarantees." Id.
138. Strossen, supra note 137, at 88.
139. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
140. Id. at 486.
141. Id. at 502-03 (White, J., concurring).
142. See LEE EPSTEIN & THOMAS G. WALKER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW FOR A
CHANGING AMERICA 420 (4th ed. 2001).
143. 405 U.S. 438 (1972). Some commentators view the holding in Eisenstadt as a
stepping stone from the rather narrow ruling in Griswold to the expansive one in Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). See generally GERALD GUNTHER & KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 528 (David L. Shapiro et al. eds., 13th ed. 1997).
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contraceptives to unmarried persons was as equally impermissible as the
statute in Griswold affecting married persons.'" The Court struck down
the statute as a violation of the privacy rights of single persons under the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. In effect,
Eisenstadt expanded the right to privacy. The Court's opinion stated:
"If the right to privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual,
married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion
into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether
to bear or beget a child.""'
Griswold and its offspring carved out the right to procreate from the
broader and more implicit Fourteenth Amendment right to privacy. 7
Once the court determines that a statute implicates the constitutionally
protected right to privacy, the statute is not per se invalid; but rather, it
is subjected to strict scrutiny.' s4 In order to withstand strict scrutiny, the
statute may be justified by a "compelling state interest" which is
"narrowly drawn to express only those interests. "149
In accordance with the aforementioned cases, the majority,
concurrences, and dissents in Oakley,5 °all conceded that Oakley's right
to procreate was indeed a fundamental one.' However, the Wisconsin
Supreme Court was divided on the question of what the appropriate test
was to determine the constitutionality of the probation condition.'52
144. Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 453-55.
145. See id. at 443.
146. Id. at 453.
147. See generally GUNTHER & SULLIVAN, supra note 143, at 529. Griswold's progeny
includes, for example: Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. 430; Roe, 410 U.S. 113; Carey v. Population
Services International, 431 U.S. 678 (1977); Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973), etc. GUNTHER
& SULLIVAN, supra note 143, at 527-37. Wisconsin has also recognized the right to
procreate. See, e.g., Weber v. City of Cedarburg, 370 N.W.2d 791, 795 (Wis. Ct. App. 1985)
("The right of privacy is a relatively narrow right, limited to protection against government
interference in matters such as marriage, procreation, contraception, child rearing and
education.") (emphasis added).
148. Carey, 431 U.S. at 685-86.
149. Id. at 686 (quoting Roe, 410 U.S. at 155-56).
150. State v. Oakley, 629 N.W.2d 200 (Wis. 2001).
151. Id.
152. Justice Wilcox, delivering the majority opinion, stated that "'conditions of
probation may impinge upon constitutional rights as long as they are not overly broad and are
reasonably related to the person's rehabilitation."' Id. at 210 (quoting Edwards v. State, 246
N.W.2d 109 (Wis. 1976)). In her dissent, Justice Bradley (joined by Chief Justice Abrahamson
and Justice Sykes) wrote that "[t]he State must justify its action by establishing that it is
narrowly drawn in light of the governmental interest at stake." Id. at 217 (Bradley, J.,
dissenting) (citations omitted). Justice Sykes (joined by Chief Justice Abrahamson and
Justice Bradley), in her dissent, agreed with the majority's test, but the majority argued that
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Oakley argued strict scrutiny was the appropriate test,'53 while the
majority tested the condition's constitutionality under a reasonableness
standard.15 ' In her dissent, Justice Bradley argued that the fundamental
nature of the right to procreate required a heightened scrutiny.'
This writer argues that the correct test is not strict scrutiny,56 which
would be appropriate only if Oakley were entitled to enjoy the same
degree of freedom as those citizens who have not violated the law;
rather, the correct test is what some courts have termed special
scrutiny.' As discussed in Part IV.B, many federal and state courts have
applied special scrutiny when assessing a condition that impinges upon a
fundamental right, like the right to procreate.'58 The California Court of
Appeals in People v. Pointer'9 applied this heightened scrutiny to a
probation condition that infringed upon the probationer's fundamental
right to procreate, similar to Oakley's condition. '6°
Ruby Pointer was convicted of willfully endangering her two
Justice Sykes actually adhered to a strict scrutiny analysis in her application. Id. at 208.
153. Id. at 207-08.
154. Id. at 210 n.27.
155. Id. at 217 (Bradley, J., dissenting). In her dissent, Justice Bradley articulated a
heightened scrutiny to test the condition's constitutionality. Id. (Bradley, J., dissenting). In
order to be constitutional, a probation condition must be "reasonably related to the
probationer's rehabilitation" and "narrowly drawn" to meet the State's interest, while not
being "overly broad." Id. at 217-18 (Bradley, J., dissenting). While this level of scrutiny
bears semantic resemblance to the majority's test, the result is wholly different. A distinction
between the two tests might be that Justice Bradley's heightened scrutiny places a burden on
the State to show that the condition is "narrowly drawn." Id. at 218 (Bradley, J., dissenting).
156. The majority in Oakley argued that the probation condition survived strict scrutiny,
though strict scrutiny was not the correct test. See Oakley, 629 N.W.2d at 207 n.23. Instead
the majority and Justice Sykes agreed that the correct test was the following: "[C]onditions of
probation may impinge upon constitutional rights as long as they are not overly broad and are
reasonably related to [the probationer's] rehabilitation." Id. at 221 (Sykes, J., dissenting)
(quoting Edwards v. State, 246 N.W.2d 109 (Wis. 1976)). However, the majority did not
agree with Justice Sykes' application of the standard. Id. at 208. The Pointer court invoked
special scrutiny in their review of the constitutionality of a probation condition. 199 Cal.
Rptr. 357, 365 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984). The court provided a workable definition of special
scrutiny. See discussion infra notes 163-70 and accompanying text. The dissent did not
identify the appropriate test as special scrutiny, but did adopt and apply elements of special
scrutiny set forth in Pointer. Oakley, 629 N.W.2d at 221-22. Although the distinction
between strict scrutiny and special scrutiny appears to be a semantic one, it is important to
recognize that the test used for ordinary citizens is more "strict" than that used for convicted
criminals. For this reason, the author here emphasizes the distinction between the two tests.
157. See infra text accompanying notes 167-68.
158. See supra notes 123-35 and accompanying text.
159. 199 Cal. Rptr. 357, 365 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984).
160. Id. at 365.
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children.' Her failure to adequately nourish her children resulted in
their underdevelopment and neurological damage. 2 Subsequent to her
conviction, Ruby was sentenced to five years probation with various
conditions attached. 3 She challenged a condition that prohibited her
from conceiving during the probationary period.'64 In addressing the
constitutionality of the condition, the court undertook a two-part
analysis.' 5 First, the court assessed the condition in terms of its
reasonableness.'" The court held the condition to be reasonable,
especially because the condition prohibiting conception was related to
child endangerment.67
The court did not end its analysis there, but further determined that
when a condition impinges upon a fundamental right, "we must
additionally determine whether the condition is impermissibly
overbroad."'68 The court assessed constitutionality of the condition
based on the following criteria:
[A] governmental entity seeking to impose... [a probation]
condition [] must establish: (1) that the conditions reasonably
relate to the purposes sought by the legislation which confers the
benefit; (2) that the value accruing to the public from imposition
of those conditions manifestly outweighs any resulting
impairment of constitutional rights; and (3) that there are
161. Id. at 360. Ruby Pointer was convicted under California Penal Code sections 273a
and 278.5. Section 273a reads as follows:
(1) Any person who, under circumstances or conditions likely to produce great
bodily harm or death.... willfully causes or permits any child to suffer, or inflicts
thereon unjustifiable physical pain or mental suffering, or having the care or custody
of any child, willfully causes or permits the person or health of such child to be
injured, or willfully causes or permits such child to be placed in such situation that its
person or health is endangered, is punishable by imprisonment in the county jail not
exceeding one year, or in the state prison for 2, 3, or 4 years.
199 Cal. Rptr. 357,360 n.3 (quoting Cal. Penal Code § 273a(1) (West 1984)).
162. Id. at 360.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 364-66.
166. Id. at 363-64. The court employed the three-part test established in People v.
Dominguez, 64 Cal. Rptr. 290, 293 (Cal. App. 1967). The three-part test is discussed supra
Part III.C.
167. Pointer, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 364.
168. Id. at 364. In assessing whether a condition is overbroad, the court determined "in
some cases, [it may] be necessary to determine whether the condition is impermissibly
vague." Id. at 364 n.10.
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available no alternative means less subversive of constitutional
right, narrowly drawn so as to correlate more closely with the
purposes contemplated by conferring the benefit.169
When the court applied this heightened level of special scrutiny,7 ' it
held the probation condition to be unconstitutional."' The court
construed the condition as failing to serve any rehabilitative purpose,
only protecting the public "by preventing injury to an unborn child." '
Further, the court maintained that the purpose of the condition could
"be served by alternative restrictions less subversive of appellant's
fundamental right to procreate." ' In short, the condition prohibiting
conception was an overbroad restriction on Pointer's fundamental right
174to procreate.
Similarly, the probation condition in Oakley7 1 would fail the three-
part test because it, too, serves no rehabilitative purpose and there are
alternative means to reach the same end.77 The Oakley majority
rejected this special scrutiny analysis altogether,77 contending that
Oakley's right to procreate was not totally eliminated because he could
satisfy the condition by making an effort to support his children.7 7 Thus,
they argued, reasonableness was the appropriate standard of review
because the fundamental right was not eliminated altogether. In her
dissent, Justice Bradley argued that the condition effectively eliminated
Oakley's right to procreate because he would be unable to financially
support his children.179  The dissenters felt heightened scrutiny was
appropriate because Oakley's fundamental right to procreate was
compromised by the condition.' Although the statute under which
169. Id. at 365 n.l (emphasis in original omitted) (quoting Parrish v. Civil Serv.
Comm'n, 57 Cal. Rptr. 623 (1967)).
170. The Pointer court subjected the condition to special scrutiny and employed the
aforementioned criteria to determine whether the condition was constitutional. Id. at 365.
171. Id. at 366.
172. Id. at 365.
173. Id.
174. See id. at 366.
175. State v. Oakley, 629 N.W.2d 200 (Wis. 2001).
176. These arguments are also invoked in the dissents' opinions. Id. at 216-21 (Bradley,
J., dissenting); id. at 221-23 (Sykes, J., dissenting).
177. The majority argued that the appropriate test was the reasonability standard. In
applying this standard, they found the condition was not overly broad. Id. at 212.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 217 ("The majority and both concurrences frame the condition as if it only
forbids an intentional refusal to pay support. This is not the case.").
180. Id. at 216-23 (Bradley, J., dissenting).
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Oakley was convicted required intent,'8' the condition itself merely
stated that, "Oakley cannot have any more children unless he
demonstrates that he had the ability to support them and that he is
supporting the children he already had."'
82
Even if one construed the probation condition, as did the majority,
as permitting Oakley to procreate once he demonstrated only his
intention and effort to support his present children, the condition was
still unconstitutional. Justice Bablitch was incorrect in his
concurrence183 -the distinction between the intentional refusal and the
inability to pay support is simply insignificant because under either
interpretation, the condition does not meet the requisite rehabilitative
objective. Preventing one from fathering another child does not
rehabilitate a man who is already a father."' Whether or not the
probation condition is rehabilitative is determinative under the Pointer
analysis, and should have been determinative in Oakley, as well. 5
Accordingly, there are alternative means (e.g., mandatory job training
or parenting classes) to serve the same salutary purpose. 6 Further, the
practical problems of this probation condition, which prohibits only
conception and not sexual intercourse itself, are self-evident and
unworkable, as discussed below.'
181. See Wis. STAT. § 948.22(2) (1999-2000) (designating a Class E felony for any
person "who intentionally fails for 120 or more consecutive days to provide spousal,
grandchild or child support which the person knows or reasonably should know the person is
legally obligated to provide .... ").
182. Oakley, 629 N.W.2d at 203 (emphasis added).
183. See id. at 214 (Bablitch, J., concurring) ("The two dissents frame the issue in such a
way that Oakley's intentional refusal to pay support evolves into the inability to pay support.
This case is not at all about an inability to pay support; it is about the intentional refusal to
pay support.").
184. See People v. Pointer, 199 Cal. Rptr. 357, 365 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984) (holding that the
condition was not intended to serve any rehabilitative purpose but rather to protect the
public). Even if Oakley does not try to pay child support, preventing him from fathering
more children only treats the symptom, not the problem. Obviously he has a misconception
of what a father's obligations are to his children-whether financial or otherwise.
185. Id. at 365-66. In the majority opinion in Oakley, the court recognized that the
correct test was not strict scrutiny, but rather "'conditions of probation may impinge upon
constitutional rights as long as they are not overly broad and are reasonably related to the
person's rehabilitation."' Oakley, 629 N.W.2d at 210 (emphasis added) (quoting Edwards v.
State, 246 N.W.2d 109 (Wis. 1974)).
186. Many courts have found alternative* means which are less restrictive on the
probationer's constitutional rights. See, e.g., People v. Zaring, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d 263, 268 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1992); Pointer, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 365; Trammell v. Indiana, 751 N.E.2d 283, 289 (Ind.
Ct. App. 2001).
187. See Oakley, 629 N.W.2d at 220 (Bradley, J., dissenting) ("[T]he condition of
probation is unworkable").
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V. RAMIFICATIONS, PRACTICAL PROBLEMS, AND ALTERNATIVE
SOLUTIONS
A. Coercive Abortion
In addition to the infringement upon Oakley's fundamental rights,
the probation condition may indirectly curtail his partner's rights, as
well.'88 Justice Bradley argued that:
Because the condition is triggered only upon the birth of a child,
the risk of imprisonment creates a strong incentive for a man inOakley's position to demand from the woman the termination ofher pregnancy. It places the woman in an untenable position:
have an abortion or be responsible for Oakley going to prison for
eight years." 9
Indeed, many courts have recognized the risk of coercive abortion
when imposing a condition prohibiting procreation. 9"° The Pointer court
noted that if the probationer became pregnant during her probation, she
might feel compelled to obtain an abortion. 9' The court stated that "[a]
condition of probation that might place a defendant in this position, and,
if so, be coercive of abortion, is in our view improper. "'"
As was the case in Pointer, such a probation condition is oftenplaced upon a woman-prohibiting her from bearing children.'" In
Oakley, the condition was imposed upon Oakley himself, but if he were
to impregnate a woman, she might feel pressure to procure an abortion
to prevent Oakley from going to prison.'94 Should a woman becomepregnant with Oakley's child, her right to choose whether or not to bear
the child is thus compromised based on the knowledge that if she gives
birth to his child, Oakley will be sent to prison and will certainly not pay
child support. '  Whereas, if Oakley's probation condition instead
mandated parenting classes, the same impregnated woman would notface the threat of Oakley's imprisonment when considering her options.
188. Id. (Bradley, J., dissenting).
189. Id. (Bradley, J., dissenting).
190. See, e.g., Zaring, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 268; Pointer, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 365; Trammell,
751 N.E.2d at 289.
191. 199 Cal. Rptr. at 366.
192. Id.
193. See, e.g., Zaring, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d 263; Trammell, 751 N.E.2d 283.
194. Oakley, 629 N.W.2d at 219 (Bradley, J., dissenting).
195. Id. (Bradley, J., dissenting).
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Although it is an overstatement to argue that the probation condition
defeats a woman's right to choose altogether, it should at least be
recognized that a woman's right to choose under these circumstances is
diminished due to the consequences of bearing Oakley's child.
B. Practical Problems
In addition to the potential risk of coercive abortion, the nature of
Oakley's probation condition is also inherently impracticable.'96 As the
dissent correctly pointed out, Oakley is not prohibited from having
sexual intercourse, and he cannot realistically be restrained from having
unprotected sex.'97
The Pointer court acknowledged the difficulty of monitoring the use
of contraception, and the court suggested that "it might be more
advisable to simply incarcerate her now rather than wait for her to
violate probation."'98 Likewise, the Trammell'" court noted that even
the best contraceptive devices are not fail-safe, which raises the
possibility that a probationer might conceive even when using
"reasonable precautions to comply with the condition imposed. 2""
The probation condition in Oakley is problematic because there is
no realistic way to prevent Oakley from impregnating another woman.201
The condition does not prohibit Oakley from having sexual intercourse;
rather, it prohibits him from conceiving a child, an event which is
ultimately beyond his control. Further, should a woman become
pregnant and bear Oakley's child, the condition will be violated and he
will be sent to prison for a term of eight years; leaving his children
without financial support for the duration.2"
In addition to the problems of enforcement, many commentators
argue that the Oakley decision did not directly address the non-support
issue. Jacquelyn Boggess, a senior policy analyst for the Center on
Fathers, Families and Public Policy, stated of the case: "The justices
purport to address the problem of taking care of poor children... I
don't think it does that at all. Whether or not this man has a child while
196. Id. at 220 (Bradley, J., dissenting).
197. Id. (Bradley, J., dissenting).
198. People v. Pointer, 199 Cal. Rptr. 357 362 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984) (quoting Dr. Barbara
0. Murray, a psychologist who examined the probationer).
199. Trammell v. Indiana, 751 N.E.2d 283,289 n.8 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001).
200. Id. at 289 (citations omitted).
201. Oakley, 629 N.W.2d at 220 (Bradley, J., dissenting).
202. Id. (Bradley, J., dissenting).
2002.1
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
on probation, what was done [in this decision] won't get his or children
of any poor men supported."2 3 In other words, prohibiting Oakley fromfathering more children does not provide him with a realistic or practical
way to meet his current support obligations. His nine children are in nobetter position after the Wisconsin Supreme Court ruling than beforebecause as Oakley himself admitted, "unless he wins the lottery," he will
not be able to bring his arrearages up to date.204
C. Alternatives
Oakley's probation condition is not only unconstitutional andimpracticable, but there are suitable alternatives that would effectuate
the State's interest. In United States v. Smith,2 °5 the Eighth Circuit
reviewed a probation condition similar to that found in Oakley.2°
Jesse Smith had been charged with attempting to possess heroin and
was sentenced to a period of imprisonment, followed by a three-year
supervised release.2° Smith challenged the following condition of his
release: "[D]uring his period of supervised release, defendant shall not
cause the conception of another child other than to his wife, unless he
can demonstrate he is fully providing support to the three children
presently in existence .... ,,208 Like the dissent in Oakley, the Smith
majority held that imposition of such a condition was beyond the
authority of the court."" Further, the Smith court suggested that, in the
alternative, the court could require Smith to "work conscientiously at
suitable employment or pursue conscientiously a course of study or
vocational training that will equip him for suitable employment. "21 0
These conditions are akin to those suggested for Oakley in JusticeBradley's dissent.2"' For example, Oakley could be placed on probation
with a condition that he serve jail time with work release privileges,
work two full-time jobs, or attend parenting classes.2 2
These alternatives are consistent with the goals of a national
203. Dennis Chaptman, High Court Limits Dad's Procreation; Justices Split on GenderLines in Child Support Case, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, July 11,2001, at 01A.
204. Oakley, 629 N.W.2d at 217 (Bradley, J., dissenting).
205. 972 F.2d 960 (8th Cir. 1992).
206. Id. at 961.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Id. at 962.
210. Id. (citation omitted).
211. State v. Oakley, 629 N.W.2d 200,218 (Wis. 2001) (Bradley, J., dissenting).
212. Id. (Bradley, J., dissenting).
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research project entitled, "Parent's Fair Share." '213 This program was
designed to help so-called deadbeat dads meet their child support
payments .2 " The fathers were referred by the courts and then required
to participate in numerous activities, including a rehabilitation process
whereby they attended peer support groups, learned parenting skills,
and underwent job-training, to name a few.15 Overall, the research
conducted during this study indicated that the program led to increased
payments to the child support agencies.1
In short, the above alternatives would advance the State's interest in
requiring Oakley to provide child support for his children. Yet, these
conditions would not undermine Oakley's fundamental right to bear
children.
VI. CONCLUSION
There is no doubt that David Oakley's nine children have suffered as
a result of his poor parenting choices. However, their situation will not
be improved by the imposition of an unconstitutional and impractical
probation condition-prohibiting Oakley from fathering more children.
In upholding this condition, the four male justices of the Wisconsin
Supreme Court erroneously adopted the lax reasonability standard
when testing the constitutionality of the probation condition. Oakley's
preferred strict scrutiny test was equally inappropriate, since
probationers are not entitled to the same freedoms as law-abiding
citizens.2' The Wisconsin Supreme Court should have analyzed the
condition under the special scrutiny analysis, adopted by other courts
where fundamental rights are at issue. Under that test, Oakley's
probation condition unquestionably fails because there are alternative
means to achieve the same goal, and the condition does nothing to
rehabilitate Oakley to become a more supportive father. In other
words, stripping Oakley of his most fundamental right to procreate will
not necessarily result in him becoming a better parent to those children
he already has. To achieve that goal, the court could have fashioned a
probation condition, thereby requiring Oakley to attend job-training or
213. See generally EARL S. JOHNSON ET AL., FATHER'S FAIR SHARE: HELPING POOR
MEN MANAGE CHILD SUPPORT AND FATHERHOOD 1-7 (1999).
214. See id.
215. See id.
216. Id. at 15.
217. Oakley, 629 N.W.2d at 214.
218. Id. at 207-08.
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parenting classes. Further, the majority should have at least considered
the reproductive rights of Oakley's female sexual partners before
upholding this condition. David Oakley, a deadbeat dad and
probationer, though not entitled to the same freedoms as a law-abiding
citizen, should have been afforded the protection of the special scrutiny
analysis when the court evaluated the constitutionality of his probation
condition. The three female justices219 on the Wisconsin Supreme Court
correctly noted that the majority's holding in this case was
unprecedented in the United States22-- and so, it should have remained.
ELIZABETH F. MCCRIGHT*
219. The three dissenters are comprised of the three female justices on the Wisconsin
Supreme Court: Chief Justice Shirley S. Abrahamson, Justice Ann Walsh Bradley, and Justice
Diane S. Sykes.
220. Oakley, 629 N.W.2d at 216 (Bradley, J., dissenting) ("Today's decision makes this
court the only court in the country to declare constitutional a condition that limits a
probationer's right to procreate based on his financial ability to support his children.").
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